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MODEL PROTOKOL PE	GESAHA	 BERSAMA BAGI SISTEM RFID 
BERKOS RE	DAH BERDASARKA	 	ILAI RAWAK BERPETALA 
ABSTRAK 
Mereka bentuk sebuah protokol kos rendah yang boleh dipercayai dan selamat untuk 
mengenal pasti frekuensi radio (RFID) adalah amat sukar. Piawai primitif 
kriptografik boleh menjadi suatu kekangan untuk tag berkos rendah memandangkan 
ia memerlukan kos yang agak besar dan mahal dari segi saiz litar, penggunaan kuasa, 
dan saiz ingatan. Oleh itu, kriptografi ultra-ringan dalam mereka bentuk protokol 
RFID berkos rendah yang mampu melaksanakan sesi komunikasi data dengan cekap 
dan berkesan amat diperlukan bagi menangani masalah bebanan pangkalan data, 
serangan pasif, penyahlarasan dan masalah kos pengkomputeran yang tinggi. Tesis 
ini memperkenalkan model (SRV) untuk mereka bentuk protokol keselamatan berkos 
rendah yang cekap, dan mencadangkan dua protokol RFID berkos rendah yang 
selamat (SURV dan SLRV) berdasarkan pengesahan bersama antara ultra-ringan dan 
ringan dengan menggunakan gabungan primitif keselamatan konvensional dan bukan 
konvensional. 
Penilaian kualitatif dan kuantitatif yang menyeluruh telah dijalankan ke atas protokol 
yang telah direka bentuk. Kedua-dua protokol telah dianalisis secara kualitatif dari 
aspek keupayaannya menyediakan kerahsiaan data, anonimiti tag, pengesahan 
bersama dan integriti data, keupayaan mengendalikan keselamatan ke hadapan dan 
serangan yang dimainkan semula, penyahlarasan, dan serangan manusia-di-tengah 
dan serangan pendedahan. Kedua-dua protokol telah mencapai prestasi keselamatan 
yang ketara positif dalam semua aspek berbanding dengan semua protokol dalam 
literatur yang dikaji sebelum ini. Begitu juga, kedua-dua protokol telah dinilai secara 
kuantitatif terhadap serangan pasif dengan menggunakan alatan Diehard dan ENT, 
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yang telah membuktikan tahap keselamatan yang tinggi menerusi mesej yang sangat 
rawak, dan terhadap beban pangkalan data dengan menggunakan tiga algoritma 
carian yang berbeza ke atas tiga set data yang saiznya berbeza mengikut pilihan. 
Selain itu, pelaksanaan yang dicadangkan telah dikemukakan untuk memperlihatkan 
kecekapan kos bagi protokol yang dicadangkan. Penilaian ini juga merangkumi 
pengesahan keselamatan dengan menggunakan alat AVISPA. Walau bagaimanapun, 
keputusan terhadap keupayaan AVISPA mengesahkan protokol RFID umumnya  dan 
protokol kami khususnya, membuahkan hasil yang negatif. 
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MUTUAL AUTHE	TICATIO	 PROTOCOL MODEL FOR LOW-COST 
RFID SYSTEMS BASED O	 SHELLED RA	DOM VALUE 
ABSTRACT 
Designing a reliable secure low-cost protocol for radio-frequency identification 
(RFID) is difficult, standard cryptographic primitives can become a limitation for 
low-cost tags due to their costly large requirements in terms of circuit size, power 
consumption, and memory size. Therefore, ultralightweight cryptography in 
designing low-cost RFID protocols capable of executing data communication 
sessions efficiently and effectively are needed to solve database loading, passive 
attacks, desynchronization and high computational cost problems. This thesis 
presents a model (SRV) for designing efficient low-cost security protocols, and 
proposes two low-cost RFID secure protocols (SURV and SLRV) based on 
ultralightweight and lightweight mutual authentication using a combination of 
conventional and unconventional security primitives.  
Comprehensive qualitative and quantitative evaluations were performed on the 
designed protocols. Both protocols have been analyzed qualitatively for its ability to 
provide data confidentiality, tag anonymity, mutual authentication and data integrity, 
capability to handle forward security and replay attacks, desynchronization, and 
man-in- the-middle and disclosure attacks. Both protocols achieved significant 
positive security performance in all aspects compared to all protocols in the studied 
literature. Similarly, both protocols have been evaluated quantitatively using Diehard 
and ENT tools for passive attacks, which proofed high security through highly 
randomized messages, and against database loading using three different search 
algorithms on three datasets with different sizes alternatively. Furthermore, proposed 
implementations have been put forward to illustrate the cost efficiency for the 
 xvii
proposed protocols. The evaluation also included security verification using the 
AVISPA tools. However, the results on the capability of AVISPA to verify RFID 
protocols in general and our protocols in particular, came out negative. 
 
 
 
Chapter 1 
I	TRODUCTIO	  
 
1.1 Introduction 
Before the advent of electronic communication and data transfer, preserving data 
security was simpler in some ways. Records were produced by hand and stored on 
paper, and physical access to them was limited by keeping valuable documents in a 
safe. This minimized the risk of altering or destroying the data. Electronic 
communication aimed to mimic the whole process by electronically storing, 
securing, and exchanging data. Methods to grant access only to authorized entities 
(e.g., encryption) were also invented. The more important and sophisticated the 
system (hardware and software), the more challenging and innovative the attack. 
Therefore, several initiatives were taken to protect data depending on the 
communication model measures and the relative importance of the data, while most 
studies focused on minimizing the cost of these measures to widen the security 
primitives a system holds.  
Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID) technology is a promising data 
communication tool for wide adoption due to its simplicity, relatively low cost, and 
wide range of data volume capacity and implementation models, especially in 
identity verification, supply chain, and asset management (Weinstein, 2005). The 
promised benefits of RFID include authentication-based access, productivity gains in 
the warehouse, better product visibility in the distribution channel, improved 
inventory accuracy, less shrinkage, reduced number of transaction errors, better asset 
tracking and utilization, and easier detection of counterfeit products, such as fake 
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identity cards (Michael and McCathie, 2005, Want, 1991). Despite these factors, the 
adoption rate of RFID technology has significantly stalled in recent years, mainly 
due to security and privacy reasons, especially in low-cost RFID. The use of RFID 
technology has engendered considerable controversy and even product boycotts by 
consumer privacy advocates in some countries because using low-security primitives 
might enable sensitive data gathering about an individual without consent, which 
jeopardizes the holder’s privacy.  
RFID is defined as a technology that uses communication via electromagnetic 
waves to exchange data between a terminal and an object, such as a product, animal, 
or person, for the purpose of identification and tracking. Some tags can be read from 
several meters away and beyond the line of sight of the reader. The RFID system 
components principally consist of tags, readers, and backend databases. The RFID 
system transmits data embedded in wave signals over an open wireless channel. 
These waves can be transmitted and received by almost anyone with the right gear, 
and thus, data encryption and entity authentication play huge roles in implementing a 
secure RFID technology. 
Several approaches have been taken to accommodate different 
implementations. Nevertheless, a large gap exists in the trade-off between the cost 
and the security level offered. Most of these approaches significantly correlate the 
two factors by linking the increase of security levels to the dramatic increase in cost, 
which in this case follows a categorization in the RFID technology binding low-cost 
RFIDs to low-security primitives. For this reason, this thesis attempts to reduce the 
aforementioned gap by providing low-cost and high-security level RFID solutions 
using different methods to enable various implementations of utilizing the underlying 
algorithms. The solutions include introducing RFID technology with a new notion of 
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shelled data under two protocols, namely, Shelled Ultralightweight Random Value 
(SURV) and Shelled Lightweight Random Value (SLRV). 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section portrays the 
background for the technology, and the security concerns and solution standards 
within the security protocols. Section 1.3 shows the problem statements. 1.4 lists the 
thesis objectives. The motivation behind the research and its significance are 
illustrated in Section 1.5. The scope of the research is shown in Section 1.6. We 
conclude with the organization and outlines for the rest of the thesis in Section 1.7. 
1.2 Background of the research 
RFID systems produce methodologies that offer data portability by embedding data 
in small devices (tags) that can be mobile and held within other objects. These data 
may include identification to grant access authentication for several transactions or 
entry passes through secured checkpoints in different locations. The security and 
privacy issues for these data are vulnerable to various threats (Shih et al., 2005, Kim 
et al., 2007, Knospe and Pohl, 2004, Sarma et al., 2002). Recent studies in RFID 
attempted to find solutions for several applications within the field. However, the 
solutions offered are often hindered by the fact that, in most cases, different RFID 
deployments do not meet required security specifications and needs (Kim et al., 
2007, M. Naser, 2008, Rotter, 2008). These solutions could also be hindered by other 
implementation obstacles, such as cost and compliance with existing RFID 
standards. 
RFID technology implementation represents a wireless network where data 
transfer or exchange is mainly secured by encrypting the data over the open channels 
and decrypting the data at the authorized entities when received. Any security 
protocol designed to fulfill the needs and special requirement of this technology 
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should conform to the implantation specifications and standards. We give an 
overview of development environment components, such as network security, 
security protocols, and cryptography, and define the RFID system and its relative 
importance in the foreseen implementations. 
1.2.1 	etwork Security and Protocols   
Computer networks are defined as a collection of computers and devices 
interconnected by communications channels that facilitate communication among 
users (businesses, government agencies, individuals, and machines) and allow them 
to share resources. Networks may be classified into public (open access) or private 
(controlled access) based on the utilizing users. Networks mainly consist of nodes, 
servers, and/or host computers. Nodes refer to “client” terminals (e.g., individual 
user PCs). 
All procedures, processes, and actions performed to ensure network usability, 
integrity, sustainability, privacy, and value of data and operations are acknowledged 
as Network Security. Measures, characterized as short programs used to 
protect computer data and communication in transit over a network, are called 
network security protocols (Kaufman et al., 2002). The primary tool used to protect 
information as it travels across a network is cryptography (see Section 1.2.2). 
Cryptography performs data encryption via algorithms to render data readable only 
by authorized users. In general, cryptography for delivering a secure data transfers 
through a set combination of procedures or protocols that manage the exchange of 
data between networks and devices. Furthermore, any effective network security 
strategy requires the identification of possible threats, and accordingly, the most 
effective combination of procedures, tools, and protocols to defend against the 
identified threats is chosen. 
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Common threats to network security include threat tools (e.g., Viruses, Trojan 
horse programs, and Vandals) and threatening actions (e.g., Data Attacks, Data 
Interception, and Social Engineering). The latter can use one or more tools in 
achieving its purpose. The following are brief descriptions for these threats: 
- Viruses: Computer programs written by devious programmers and designed 
to replicate themselves and infect computers when triggered by a specific event  
- Trojan horse programs: Delivery vehicles for destructive codes that appear 
to be harmless or useful software programs such as games  
- Vandals: Software applications or applets that cause destruction   
- Data Attacks: Reconnaissance attacks (information-gathering activities to 
collect data that are later used to compromise networks), access attacks (exploits 
network vulnerabilities to gain entry to e-mail, databases, or the corporate network), 
and denial-of-service attacks (prevents access to a part of or the entire computer 
system)  
- Data Interception: Involves eavesdropping on communications or altering 
data packets being transmitted  
- Social Engineering: Obtaining confidential network security information 
through nontechnical means, such as posing as a technical support person and asking 
for people's passwords 
In this context, security protocols are gaining increased importance in almost 
any data transaction activity in all networks domains, especially in organizational and 
business transactions. Security protocols aim to provide confidentiality, authenticity, 
privacy, anonymity, and fairness, among many others. Moreover, we argue that 
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theories should provide integrity when coupled with applications. In the sense of 
network security applications, the vulnerability of any protocol can be found in an 
application even after the protocol is accepted as a standard. A popular example is the 
Needham-Schroeder protocol (Needham and Schroeder, 1978), in which Lowe 
discovered a flaw 17 years after the protocol’s publication (Lowe, 1996, Lowe, 
1995). This proves that using a strong security solution does not necessarily protect 
against all possible threats. Again, proper network security strategy and consideration 
of different variables play huge roles in securing any network. Figure 1.1 provides 
proof for this notion. 
1.2.2 Cryptography  
The notion of cryptography has been in use for centuries for civilian and military 
purposes (e.g., cipher wheels or marks on papers in World War I, and Purple machine 
and Enigma in World War II) . Cryptography has significantly developed with the 
help of technology to provide a high level of security for data exchanged in daily 
essential communications, such as Internet communications, banking transactions, 
and wireless communication. It has helped introduce new communication models 
and has radically reshaped some existing communication methods. 
Cryptography can be defined as the art of protecting information by 
converting (encrypting) data into scrambled, unreadable, and/or unmeaningful code 
(cipher-text) that can be sent across public or private unsecured network channels to 
be understood only by the intended recipient. Cryptography reverses these data into 
the original form (decryption). It is generally designed to provide confidentiality, 
authentication, integrity, and accessibility services (Stallings, 2010). 
Confidentiality service is used to ensure that messages are accessible only to 
authorized recipients. Authentication is normally used to authenticate the identity of 
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the connected parties. Preventing eavesdroppers from changing the content of the 
messages sent from source to destination is basically provided by the integrity 
service. Lastly, accessibility is designed to allow only authorized parties to use 
available information resources. 
There are two main styles or forms for data encryption in cryptography: 
symmetrical and asymmetrical. Symmetrical encryption algorithms use a secret key 
shared by both sides of the communication for encrypting the data on one side and 
decrypting it on the other side. Hence, this method is referred to by different studies 
as secret-key, shared-key, and private-key encryption. In this method, the encryption 
and decryption keys can be exact copies or, for an enhanced level, loosely related to 
each other. 
Asymmetrical encryption, on the other hand, does not dictate 
a secure initial exchange between both sides of the transaction for one or more secret 
keys. Asymmetric algorithms create a mathematically related key pair, a published 
public key and a secret private key. The former is used to encrypt a message which 
can only be decrypted using the private key. This helps protect the 
confidentiality and integrity of a message. Similarly, private key encryption creates a 
digital signature for a message, which can be verified by the public key to preserve 
the message’s authenticity. 
The process of breaking the encryption protocol or algorithm (code breaking) 
aimed at obtaining the hidden information and/or preventing the communication 
session from successfully completing is known as cryptanalysis. Methods of 
avoiding security measures for exchanging data in a protocol include understanding 
how the system works and finding a way to get around it through obtaining the secret 
key to decrypt data, misleading the receiver by injecting false data, or revoking the 
 8
authenticity capability for futuristic communication. The definition of cryptanalysis 
implies the performing of logical attacks via mathematical perception and standards, 
excluding physical attacks such as bribery, physical coercion, burglary, keystroke 
logging, and social engineering because these attacks are independent from the 
security model set by the cryptography scheme.  
In cryptographic taxonomy, both cryptography and cryptanalysis are part of 
one science under the name of Cryptology, which intends to acquire a better 
understanding of the methods of securing information and communication 
technologies. The sciences of Cryptology and its cryptographic primitives are 
depicted in Figure 1.2. 
 Figure 1.1: Taxonomy of Cryptology 
Figure 1.2 illustrates the categories and sub-categories of cryptosystems, 
where cryptology science is divided into a Cryptanalysis category and a 
Cryptography category. The former is further classified into passive attacks aiming to 
obtain the confidential data and active attacks aiming to alter the exchanged 
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messages’ data, and the latter is further classified into two sub-categories: 
Authentication and Encryption. Authentication is comprised of hash functions and 
certificates authentication, and Encryption is comprised of the aforementioned 
symmetric and asymmetric cryptosystems. In this research, we only focus on mutual 
authentication, which falls under cryptography. 
Data security is a mathematical definition based upon the application of a 
given encryption. From a cryptography perspective, although symmetric and 
asymmetric cryptosystems share the same goal of successfully encrypting and 
decrypting users’ messages, the principal deviance between those cryptosystems is 
the use of an additional key in the asymmetric cryptosystems. Conversely, the 
fundamentals defer from a cryptanalysis perspective, where symmetric 
cryptosystems are vulnerable to plain-text attacks and linear cryptanalysis, usually 
characterizing high risk by being simple to decode. Careful planning for the 
cryptographic process coding and functions is therefore necessary to reduce this risk. 
Asymmetric encryption is considered relatively harder to break and has proved to be 
secure against intruders with computationally limited resources because it requires 
much more complicated mathematical processes to bypass the security and, in 
particular, because the private key cannot be derived from the public key. A common 
method of asymmetric encryption is using a random key generated by the public key 
of the sender. This method varies in application depending on the encryption protocol 
and its intended use. 
1.2.3 Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID) 
Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID) is basically a technology for wireless 
information exchange over short distances (Riedl et al., 2007). RFID technology uses 
radio waves to identify and track animals, objects, products, and even humans. It was 
 10
originally meant to replace traditional barcode systems and overcome their 
limitations because optical barcodes suffer from several drawbacks, such as the need 
for human intervention to scan the barcode, required physical manipulation of the 
object to be scanned to align the barcode with scanners or the other way around, 
limited data storage on barcodes, and worst of all, the compromised readability of the 
barcode as a result of dirt, moisture, abrasion, or packaging contours (Shih et al., 
2005). These limitations, which confine the performance of the traditional barcode 
system, can be overcome by RFID. 
The benefit of RFID over the barcode system is that RFID does not require 
direct contact (line of sight scanning). RFID uses radio waves which can pass 
through objects and automatically identify the object holding the tag. In this case, 
less human intervention is needed, which, in turn reduces operation costs. 
Furthermore, the tag is embedded inside the object, which reduces the possibility of 
the tag from being susceptible to water, dirt, and similar materials that can easily 
damage the barcode. 
Radio frequencies were first used by the Allies during World War II to 
identify enemy or unfriendly aircrafts. However, at the time, its use was not 
widespread. However, later on and to date, due to the continuous decrease in the cost 
of its equipment and tags, and the increased reliability and establishment of 
international standard, RFID technology started to expand and is now widely used in 
many applications, beginning with animal tracking and identification, inventory 
applications, healthcare system  (Kuo et al., 2007), and industries  (Al-Kassab and 
Rumsch, 2008). Another important reason is the adaptation of RFID technology for 
identification at case-level of the supply chains by major retailers, such as Wal-Mart, 
Albertsons, and Target. Similarly, the U.S. Department of Defense ordered that all 
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shipments to its armed forces be equipped with RFID tags. 
Recently, research has been conducted regarding the usage of RFID 
technology for human-centric applications, such as Islamic Pilgrimage identification  
(Mohandes, 2008), crowded event management (Yamin et al., 2009), crowd 
management (Yamin and Ades, 2009), and security consideration in embedding 
RFID in “Hajj” systems (Naser et al., 2010b). To accommodate the various possible 
applications, RFID had broadened protocol development into several categories and 
sub-categories. In our research, we focus on low-cost mutual authentication sub-
categories, such as lightweight and ultralightweight protocols under several standards 
like Gen-2. 
Despite the many advantages of RFID, the main concern remains to be the 
privacy and security of the RFID systems. The information stored in an RFID tag is 
considered crucial when it involves identification, money transactions, critical 
circumstances involving RFID devices in military missions, or failures of RFID-
based healthcare systems during major surgeries, which could be life threatening.  
Lei et al. listed some security properties in their research, such as information 
leakage, intractability, forward security, and mutual authentication( Lei et al., 2010) . 
Meanwhile, common types of attacks in the RFID system, such as Man-in-the-
Middle, Malicious tracking, Denial-of-Service (DoS), Replay, and Attack against 
forward security, will be discussed in detail in Chapter 2.  
Many studies have been conducted in the attempt to overcome some of these 
security issues. Nevertheless, no standard currently exists to evaluate the overall 
security performance of these protocols. Further research needs to be done for 
standardization efforts in RFID protocol designing framework. Nonetheless, although 
most studies in securing RFID share common grounds and are based on cumulative 
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work, they do not follow an obvious RFID-consistent protocol development 
framework. 
1.3 Problem Statement  
In previous studies, the RFID tag has several types and a variety of applications 
which lead to diverse options for solving the security issues of these applications. 
Meanwhile, the low-cost RFID tag has its own limitation and security concerns, 
whereby the main goal for its protocols is to find a strong trade-off method between 
good security and low-cost implementation. The main problems faced when 
designing efficient and effective protocols are to solve Desynchronization, Database 
Loading, Tag Computations, and Passive Attacks. This research focuses on solving 
these problems; where detailed description for these concerns can be found in section 
4.2.1. 
 
1.4 Research Objectives 
The aim of this thesis is not only to develop low-cost RFID protocols but also to 
show that these protocols can outperform other protocols in terms of performance 
and security level it provide for low-cost RFID systems published in the literature. 
Thus, new alternatives for solving security problems are provided. 
The key objectives of the research presented in this thesis are as follows: 
1. To provide a critical review and analysis for significant protocols in the low-
cost RFID mutual authentication field and identify weaknesses and misuses 
of the involved security primitives.  
2. To propose a RFID protocol based on Lightweight mutual authentication 
conforming to EPC Class-1 Generation-2 standard. 
3. To propose a RFID protocol based on Ultraightweight mutual authentication. 
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4. To provide an effective evaluation for the proposed RFID protocols under a 
suitable structure. 
1.5 The Research Motivation 
RFID is expected to play an important role in future ubiquitous computing. 
According to ABI research in 2008, the total RFID revenue will amount to more than 
$5.6 billion in 2009, the global RFID industry will be valued at $9.7 billion by 2013, 
and the compound annual growth rate will be about 15%. The total volume of tags 
used worldwide will reach 10.6 billion pieces in 2011, 80% of which will be UHF 
passive tags.  
Recently, IDTechEx forecasted that the entire RFID market value will be 
$5.63 billion in 2010, up from $5.03 billion in 2009. This includes tags, readers, 
software, and services for RFID cards, labels, fobs, and all other form factors. The 
$3.27 billion of the total $5.63 billion is spent on non-carlike structures: from RFID 
labels to active tags. In retail, RFID is facing rapid growth for apparel tagging. In 
2010, this application alone demanded 300 million RFID labels. In the same year, 
RFID in the form of tickets used for transit demanded 380 million tags, while a 
substantial 178 million tags were used in the tagging of animals (such as cow, sheep, 
and pets), which has become a legal requirement in many territories. This 
phenomenon is happening in regions such as China and Australasia. In total, 2.31 
billion tags were sold in 2010 versus 1.98 billion in 2009. Most of the growth is from 
passive UHF RFID labels.  
At the same time, RFID systems also need security methods that can prevent 
several attacks. Prevention of attacks leads to increased readability of the RFID 
system. The increasing demand for securing the RFID system motivates this 
 14
research, especially in the area of low-cost RFID tag, where the demand is huge and 
increasing rapidly. 
There are many proposed solutions for securing RFID technology under 
different categories and standards. Thus far, none of these protocols have proven to 
be a universally secured protocol for a given category or standard. The limitations 
and multiple assumptions of these protocols hinder their widespread application and 
utilization. 
In this thesis, we seek to point out where previous proposals failed and which 
threats they failed to address. We do this by focusing on previously proposed 
protocols in one of the RFID standards, namely, Class-1 Generation-2 tags under the 
lightweight category to identify their strengths and weaknesses. We aim to utilize 
these protocols as basis for creating better protocols capable of providing a high 
security level, especially in terms of continuous functionality and preserved privacy. 
The expected outcome of the research in the form of two lightweight RFID 
protocols and their experimental results may generate new significant scientific and 
practical knowledge in their possible implementations. 
1.6 Scope of the Research   
Although this thesis will review different standards, it would not be possible to 
conduct a comprehensive survey of all of them, and/or create one solution fitting all 
standards due to manufacturing and implementation primitives based on the intended 
purposes of application. Therefore, the scope of this thesis will be RFID systems 
implementing lightweight and ultralightweight protocols conforming to Class-1 
Generation-2 tags, which fall under low-cost tag category. 
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1.7 Thesis Organization 
The organization of this thesis is as follows:  
First, a comprehensive explanatory platform of RFID technology literature 
review is stated in Chapter 2. This chapter comprises six sections which review RFID 
Technology, RFID standards, RFID security, RFID Privacy, RFID Attacks, and an 
overview of RFID solution categories.  
Next, an extensive literature review of low-cost mutual authentication 
protocols is provided in Chapter 3. This chapter comprises two sections reviewing 
two categories in low-cost RFID protocols, namely Lightweight mutual 
authentication protocols and Ultralightweight mutual authentication protocols, where 
each section reviews and analyze a set of significant protocols for each respective 
category and indicates weaknesses in each of the discussed protocol. 
Chapter 4 demonstrates the methodology followed by the researcher in an 
attempt to employ a state of the art method that involves using a Shelled Random 
Value (SRV) model as a development tool for two RFID low-cost mutual 
authentication protocols. The chapter also presents the evaluation framework for the 
proposed protocols with respect to the implementation restrictions. 
The first protocol named Shelled Ultralightweight Random Value (SURV) 
protocol is presented in chapter 5, which is designed based on lightweight security 
primitives on the tag side and standard cryptography primitives on the reader’s side. 
Deep dissection for performance and security analysis of SURV and comparison with 
existing protocols are presented in this chapter. 
In Chapter 6, we continue with the proposed protocols and present a Shelled 
Lightweight Random Value (SLRV) Protocol, conforming to RFID EPC Class-1 
Generation-2 standard and designed based on lightweight security primitives on the 
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tag side and standard cryptography primitives on the reader’s side. Deep dissection 
for performance and security analysis of SURV in comparison with existing 
protocols are presented in this chapter. 
The proposed protocols are evaluated in chapter 7 along with the 
implementations and testing results. In this chapter, four main considerations are 
covered. The first is evaluating the proposed protocols’ ability to protect against 
passive attacks. The second consideration is security protocol verification. The third 
consideration is evaluating the suitability and benefit of using binary search 
algorithm in the proposed protocols to reduce the time consumed for data retrieval 
from the database, and to minimize database loading. The fourth consideration is 
evaluating the proposed protocols in terms of cost efficiency and illustrating their 
logical schemes and dataflow to prove that they reduce the tag computations and thus 
are low-cost RFID security protocols. 
Finally, Chapter 8 summarizes and concludes the research that has been 
carried out to achieve this thesis. In addition, the chapter includes the summary of 
contributions, which presents the areas of contributions made and the products of the 
research which have been realized and named as SURV and SLRV. The chapter also 
highlights that both protocols have been thoroughly tested using several methods for 
evaluation against well-known published RFID security concerns, for the standards 
identified in the scope of the thesis, compromising the completion of successful 
communication sessions without jeopardizing the incorporated private data. 
Thereafter, the chapter suggests futuristic research prospects. 
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Chapter 2 
FU	DAME	TALS OF RADIO FREQUE	CY IDE	TIFICATIO	 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter explains Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID). The characteristics 
and standards of RFID technology are presented in Sections 2.2 and 2.3, 
respectively. Security concerns within the RFID technology are discussed in Section 
2.4. In Section 2.5, the significance of including privacy as a design objective is 
described. Details on possible attacks on RFID networks are presented in Section 2.6. 
Finally, an overview of RFID solution categories is given in Section 2.7. 
2.2 RFID Technology 
RFID technology is a complement to the invention of Guglielmo Marconi in 1901. 
He was the first person to transmit radio signals over the Atlantic. Since then, this 
technology has continuously developed. In 1935, radar was invented by the 
Scotsman, Alexander Watson-Watt. Despite the limitation of the radar at that time, a 
huge application for the technology was discovered in the Second World War. 
Identification Friend or Foe  was created by the British to distinguish between their 
airplanes and German aircrafts. This was considered the first RFID application. The 
first patent for this domain was the “Portable radio frequency emitting identifier” in 
1983, and the first paper was published in 1984 by Harry Stockman (Stockman, 
1984). Since the time of the IFF, the development of RFID has accumulated in areas 
of price reduction, performance improvement, enhanced security, and new 
application domains. The Massachusetts Institute of Technology  Auto-ID Centre 
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1999 was one of the most significant organizations that helped make RFID research 
recognizable. 
The extension of using the barcode for identification purposes opened 
possibilities for developing new technology to overcome limitations in barcodes, 
such as the need for direct line-of-sight within a short distance from the reader to the 
printed barcode and the long processing speed (one item at a time). RFID tags do not 
need direct line-of-sight, they can read from a long distance. RFID readers are also 
much faster (able to read several tags at a time). Furthermore, barcodes do not have a 
read/write capability and could not be reused, whereas RFID tags could be reused 
and their data overwritten. 
In general, there are three main components in RFID systems: the tag, the tag 
reader, and the backend database (Chen et al., 2010). These three components 
communicate with one another in order to identify, track, or monitor objects using 
radio frequency waves between the tag and the reader, which uses an ordinary 
network connection with the application server (backend database). Figure 2.1 
depicts a general architecture for the RFID system. 
Figure 2.1: RFID System Architecture 
The tag is basically a combination of an antenna used for transmitting and 
receiving radio frequencies and an integrated circuit that processes and stores data. 
Data can be the tag’s ID, the tag’s manufacturer, and other details related to the 
tagged item (i.e., the tag’s holder). Tags can be classified into three different groups: 
Tag 
 
Reader  DB 
System 
RF 
Tag 
Tag 
Tag 
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active, passive, and semi-passive. Active tags and semi-passive tags have internal 
batteries which aid in longer transmission ranges. Passive tags gain electricity 
through radio waves to receive and send back the necessary data to the reader(Yeh et 
al., 2010) .  
The reader retrieves any data sent by the tag and then processes these data in 
the backend database server. The reader acts as an interpreter between the tag and the 
backend database. The backend database server is responsible for the authentication 
processes and other available services (Lei et al., 2010). Often, the reader and the 
backend database server are treated, in most literature, as a single entity because the 
communication between these two components is considered secure. On the other 
hand, the open wireless communication between the tag and the reader is generally 
the main concern. 
The types of tags, readers, and even the connection with the backend database 
vary depending on the application model. In this research, we focus on the data 
communication algorithm which depends mainly on the tag type. As for the reader 
and the backend database, they are considered as one entity representing standard 
types with no special requirements. Therefore, we only illustrate different types of 
tags in RFID systems in the next sections. 
2.2.1  RFID Tags 
Basically, a RFID tag is a device that can be attached to any object in order to 
identify it. RFID tags can be classified based on their memory type, power source, 
price, and radio wave frequency range. Each of these aspects in terms of RFID 
systems are described below: 
Tag memory: a tag may contain either a writable or a non-writable (read-only) 
memory, where the data can be programmed in the tag either on manufacturer level 
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(non-writable) or in the application level (writable). Another special tag is the Write-
Once-Read-Many kind, where the tag can also be read an unlimited number of times 
but its memory is written only once to enable writing customized data. 
Tag power source: a tag can gain its power from several sources based on its type. 
Tags can recharge itself either from radio waves sent by the reader or from an 
embedded battery inside it. According to the power source, a tag can be classified as 
one of the following three sub-categories: 
- Passive tags: the tag will be active while it is in the reading range of the 
reader, where the reader supplies the tag with the needed power. Due to 
limited power source, this tag usually has a small memory and a low price. 
- Active tags: the tag is active all the time and has its own battery for power 
supply. Active tags can support higher memory capacity and more 
computational capability. They are usually very expensive compared to 
passive tags. 
- Semi-passive tags: this tag has a battery, but it only uses the battery to 
provide power for other functions when no readers are available to recharge 
the tag. 
 For the rest of the thesis, we refer to passive RFID tags as RFID tags because the 
scope of the thesis will only be limited to passive tags. Figure 2.2 depicts RFID Tag 
types based on their power source and their relation with other manufacturing 
aspects. 
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Figure 2.2: RFID Tag types based on power source   
Tag price: In terms of cost, RFID tags could be divided into two main sub-
categories, namely, low-cost RFID tags and High-Cost RFID tags. The price 
differences in RFID tags are due to variation in capabilities and manufacturing 
requirements between the two sub-categories. Low-cost tags have very limited 
computational capabilities (in terms of storage, circuitry, and power consumption), 
which makes the tag unable to perform any cryptography primitives. High-cost RFID 
tags have a microprocessor capable of performing different kinds of cryptography 
primitives. Table 2.1 shows a summary of tag features in terms of their cost 
categorization with respect to current commercial RFID tags. 
Table 2.1 illustrates that the security aspects for high-cost RFID tags are very 
much different than those for low-cost RFID tags. Circuitry located for security 
purposes in low-cost RFID tag cannot exceed 4000 logical gates. In contrast, high-
cost RFID tags can implement standard cryptography primitives, except Asymmetric 
cryptography which is too expensive. Note that the smallest hash-function proposed 
so far is the Universal Hash Function (1700 logical gates and only 64-bits of output). 
Nevertheless, this function performs around 232 operations and, therefore, does not 
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guarantee acceptable security due to the “Birthday paradox” and the ease of finding 
collisions. The rest of the cryptography functions require more than 4000 logical 
gates. For example, Standard Hash Function (SHA1) needs 8100 logical gates and 
1228 clock-cycle, and MD5 needs 8400 logical gates and 612 clock cycles, which are 
far from the specifications of low-cost tags. Furthermore, low-cost RFID tags are not 
resistant to physical and active attacks, unlike high-cost tags which are tamper 
resistant and secure against passive and active attacks.  
Table 2.1: Low-cost Versus High-cost RFID Tag (Peris-Lopez, 2008) 
 Low-cost High-cost 
Standards EPC Class-1 Generation-2 
ISO/IEC 18006-C 
ISO/IEC 14443 A/B 
 
Power Source Passively powered  Passively powered 
Circuitry 
(security processing) 
250–4000 gates  
Standard cryptographic 
primitives cannot be 
supported  
Microprocessor 
Implemented 
3DES, SHA-1, 
cannot support RSA 
Reading Distance Up to 7 m 10 cm  
Price 0.05–0.1 € Several Euros 
Physical Attacks Not resistant  
 
Tamper resistance 
EAL 5+ security level 
Resistance to Passive 
Attacks 
Yes  Yes  
Resistance to Active 
Attacks 
[52, 111, 118, 158] 
No  Yes  
 
Radio wave frequency range: RFID systems also differ by the radio wave 
frequency they use. There are several available and practical frequencies for RFID 
tags [e.g. LF (low frequency), HF (high frequency), or UHF (ultra-high frequency)]. 
The frequency for RFID systems is in the myriametric range below 135 KHz through 
short wave and ultrashort wave, or in the microwave range with the highest 
frequency being 24 GHz. Wave frequency does not affect the security protocol to be 
proposed; therefore, this aspect would be excluded in the rest of this thesis. 
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2.3 RFID standards 
There are many approved and proposed RFID standards that describe how tags and 
readers communicate with each other using air interface protocols. These are also 
known as security protocols in terms of data format, conformance, and usage of 
standards in applications. These standards are defined by several known groups such 
as the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the Electronics 
Product Code Global Incorporated (EPCglobal).  
ISO has created several RFID standards for different applications (e.g., the 
standards for animal tracking and item management). These standards differ in their 
description. For example, in animal tracking, ISO 11784 defines how data are 
structured on the tag. Meanwhile, ISO 11785 defines the air interface protocol  for 
the same application. Moreover, ISO has also standardized the air interface protocol 
of RFID tags used in payment systems and contactless smart cards in ISO-14443, 
and for vicinity cards in ISO 15693. ISO has also established standards for testing the 
conformance of RFID tags and readers in ISO-18047, and even the performance in 
ISO-18046. 
Similarly, EPCglobal also created many standards for RFID. The Electronic 
Product Code (EPC) standard is particularly well known, and its platform, the 
EPCglobal Architecture Framework(Auto-ID-Center, 2003). Figure 2.3 illustrates the 
EPCglobal Architecture Framework. 
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Figure 2.3: EPCglobal Architecture Framework(Auto-ID-Center, 2003) 
The framework is a collection of standards, which include Discovery 
Services, Object Name Service (ONS), EPC Information Services (EPCIS), 
Application Level Events (ALE), EPC Reader Protocol (RP), EPC Tag Protocol, and 
EPC Tag Data Standard (TDS). The EPCglobal also defines four classes of RFID 
tags (EPCglobal, 2007):  
Class-1: Identity Tags: Passive tags with the minimum features of an electronic 
product code (EPC) identifier, a Tag identifier (Tag ID), a function that renders a tag 
permanently non-responsive, and provides optional decommissioning or re-
commissioning of the tag, optional password-protected access control, and an 
optional user memory. 
Class-2: Higher-Functionality Tags: Passive tags holding Class-1features as well as 
an extended Tag-ID, an extended user memory, an authenticated access control, and 
an additional feature of a To-Be-Done (TBD) queue. 
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Class-3: Semi-passive tags holding Class-1features with a power source that may 
supply power to the tag and/or to its sensors, and/or sensors with optional data 
logging. 
Class-4: Active Tags: Active Tags with the minimum features of an electronic 
product code (EPC) identifier, an extended Tag-ID, authenticated access control, a 
power source, an autonomous transmitter for communications, an optional user 
memory, and optional sensors with or without data logging. 
Within these classes, every higher EPC tag class is compatible to the 
preceding class. Each higher class maintains the previous class’ capabilities and 
characteristics, and adds new features. In general, low-cost RFID tags are considered 
Class-1 with two main protocol models, Generation 1 (the basic model) and 
Generation 2 (Gen-2). Gen-2 is an enhancement of the first model. In this research, 
we consider low-cost tags conforming to the EPC Class-1 Generation-2 standard. To 
justify our choice, we compare the characteristics and details of the two generations 
of Class-1. 
2.3.1  EPC Gen-2 
EPC Class 1 Generation 2 Standard is one of the important standards in passive 
RFID tags. It was developed by EPCglobal (EPCglobal, 2008) and adopted with 
minor modifications as ISO 18000-6C in 2006 (Razaq et al., 2008). Gen-2 
characteristics define physical and logical requirements for a passive-backscatter, 
Interrogator-talks-first (ITF), RFID system operating in the 860–960 MHz frequency 
range. The tag’s power is triggered by the readers. The tag’s memory is insecure and 
susceptible to physical attacks, i.e., tags could not be trusted to store global, long-
term secrets, when left in isolation. A kill command with a 32-bit PIN is used to 
